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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah. No. 16264 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
F I L E D 
W. October 3 1 , 1979 
Arthur Leonard Heaps. 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Arthur Leonard Heaps was convicted by a 
jury of burglary and theft, both second degree felonies, 
and was sentenced on each charge to an indeterminate term of 
one to fifteen years, the sentences to run concurrently. On 
appeal, his contention is that he was denied the protections 
the law affords him, including effective assistance of 
counsel, both before and during his trial. 
One of the state's witnesses, Don Allred, testified 
that about 1:00 p.m. on May 22, 1978, he arrived home after 
attending a funeral. He noticed two automobiles, a dark 
blue Ford Mercury sedan and a white Ford Mustang, parked on 
the street near the residence of his neighbor, Pat Abbott. 
Mr. Allred stated that he saw two men approach the house. 
One of them had fuzzy dark hair and a beard, the other was 
blond haired, and both men wore Levi's and t-shirts. 
A short time later, he saw the two men leave the 
house carrying something In a long leather case and a tele-
vision set. When they drove away, through a neighbor whose 
husband is a police officer, he relayed the information to 
the police. Shortly thereafter, on the basis of the descrip-
tion of the men and the cars Involved, police Sergeant Lynn 
Turner stopped the defendant who was driving the blue Mercury 
sedan. He noticed some property in the front seat and on 
the floor of the vehicle, particularly a box with the barrel 
of a small rifle.protruding through Its top. Officer Dennis 
Davles joined Sergeant Turner, arrested the defendant and 
Impounded the car. Mr. Abbott came to the impound lot and 
Identified the items found in the blue sedan as being his. 
Officer Davles stated that he later inspected the Abbott 
residence and that the front door had been broken into. 
The defendants first assertion is that a conflict 
of Interest existed during pre-trial proceedings because he 
and a co-defendant were both represented by attorneys from 
the Legal Defender's Association. The record indicates that 
at the arraignment, subsequent bond hearings and a preliminary 
1. In violation of 76-6-202 and 76-6*404, U.C.A., 1953. 
hearing in the circuit court, etch defendant was represented 
by a different attorney from the Legal Defender1* office. 
Both defendants were bound over to the district court to 
stand trial. On August 99 1978. they noved to dismiss the 
charges on the grounds that: (1) a witness overheard testi-
mony of other witnesses at the preliminary hearing after the 
exclusion rule had been invoked, and (2) their rights against 
double Jeopardy were violated when a second preliminary 
bearing was held in the circuit court without the discovery 
of new or additional information A motion to suppress 
evidence on the ground that it had been illegally obtained 
in a warrantless search of the two cars was also made on 
behalf of each defendant. 
Before the court had heard those motions, co-
defendant Richard Garrett pled guilty to the lesser included 
offense of attempted theft and. as to him. the burglary 
charge was dismissed. Concerning the defendant, the court 
denied the motion to dismiss, but no suppression hearing was 
held because the defendant was not present. Due to his 
failure to appear for trial on August 21. 1978. a bench 
warrant was issued and bail was forfeited. About three 
months later, on November 9. 1978. the defendant was appre-
hended and brought to trial on this charge. 
The Legal Defender Association, through its director, 
ttoved to withdraw as counsel for the defendant, citing a 
conflict of interest since it was still representing the co-
defendant in sentencing proceedings following his guilty 
plea. The motion was granted and defendant's present counsel 
was appointed to represent him at trial. 
Significantly, the defendant never asked fo 
ferent counsel at any time during the pre-trial proceedings 
and he never registered any dissatisfaction with the perform-
ance of his counsel until after he was convicted and sentenced. 
Although the defendant claims there was conflict of interest. 
be does not specify what It was, other than the fact that he 
was "represented in pre-trial proceedings by the Legal 
Defender's Association, who also represented the untried co-
defendant" and that this "may require" reversal of his 
conviction and a new trial* 
To prevail on his claim, 11 would be necessary for 
it to appear that there was a conflict of Interest which in 
•ooe manner may have reacted to the defendant's detriment. 
Kothlng of that character appears In this case and Done can 
be presumed merely because different attorneys from the 
Legal Defender's office had represented defendant. 
2. State v. Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186, 417 P.2d 510 (1966); 
8tate v. Cross, 221 Kan. 98, 558 P.2d 665 (1976); State v. 
Gutierrez, 116 Ariz. 207, 568 P.2d 1105 (1977) 
3. See State •. Jelks, 105 Ariz. 175. 461 P.2d 473 1969). 
Ko. 16264 -2-
The defendant also asserts that, at trial, his 
attorney: (1) failed to attack the testimony of Mr. Allred, 
who described the two men he had seen near the Abbott resi-
dence, but did not, while testifying, identify the defendant 
as one of them; and (2) failed to object to the admission of 
photographs depicting the property located in the front seat 
and the trunk of the car the defendant was driving when he 
was arrested. 
Is we have heretofore stated, a defendant 16 
entitled to the assistance of a competent member of the Bar, 
who shows a willingness to identify himself with the interests 
of the accused and present such defenses as are available 
under the law and consistent with the ethics of the profession. 
le have found In this record nothing to Indicate that defendant 
was deprived of that entitlement* 
As to (1) above, Mr. Allred gave a sufficient des-
cription of the two men and the cars they were driving that 
the police were able to apprehend the defendant with the 
stolen property in the car he was driving. This fact itself 
seems sufficient answer to defendant's belated contention 
that his counsel should have more thoroughly cross-examined 
Sergeant Turner, 
It for (2) above, even if an objection that the 
evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal search and 
seizure had been made, it would not have been well-taken. 
Sergeant Turner had a sufficient description of the automobile 
and of the defendant to furnish him with probable cause to 
•top the car and investigate. The investigation justified 
the arrest and the seizure of the stolen property which was 
in plain sight* 
The photographs about which complaint was made 
were illustrative of material facts and no error was committed 
in receiving them in evidence. 
Affirmed. Mo costs awarded. 
This opinion is not regarded as adding anything 
significant to existing law and hence Is not to be published 
in the Utah Reporter or Pacific Reporter. 
WE' CONCUR: 
kichard J. Maughan, Justice IK Frank Wilkins, Justice 
Gordon R,""HaTl/"""Justice 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in result. 
IT Alires w. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969); 
State w. McHlcol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203 (1976). 
ft. See State w. Martinez, 28 Dtah 2d 80, 498 P.2d 651 
(1972); State w. Coffman, Utah. 584 P.2H S ^ /i**»* 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ! 
V • 4 
JOHN E. HUMPHREY, i 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
t Case No. 890333-CA 
t Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his conviction of Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Jurisdiction 
is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-
3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant was afforded effective assistance 
of counsel where both he and co-defendant were independently 
represented by attorneys from the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Office? 
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to 
support defendant's conviction for Aggravated Robbery? 
3. Whether the alleged prosecutorial misconduct did 
not amount to cumulative error justifying a new trial? 
4. Whether defendant's motion for recusal was properly 
denied? 
5. Whether defendant's due process rights were not 
violated by the prosecution's failure to preserve photos shown to 
the victim, 
6. Whether the issues raise in defendant's pro se 
supplemental brief are without merit? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The full text of the constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and rules are set forth in the argument and therefore 
need not be restated here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, John E. Humphrey, was charged with 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978). Defendant was convicted by a jury 
on June 22, 1988, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding. Judge 
Sawaya sentenced defendant to a prison term of five years to life 
with a mandatory one year firearm enhancement term and a 
discretionary five year firearm enhancement term, each to run 
consecutively (R. 284). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At about 3J30 p.m. on October 21, 1987, defendant held 
the owner of King's Custom Jewelers, Karekine Karmelian, and 
Trolley Square security guard, Stephen Church, at gunpoint as he 
While defendant does not raise the issue on appeal, respondent 
concedes that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a 
six (6) year firearm enhancement term (R. 278). Accordingly, 
this Court should remand the case to the trial court with an 
instruction to impose an enhancement term of five years. State 
v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984). 
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robbed the store of jewelry, diamonds, and cash valued at 
approximately $40,000 (T. 83-84, 89-90, 102, 174). During the 
robbery, defendant pulled a sawed-off shotgun from a cloth bag 
and directed Mr. Karmelian to empty the jewelry, diamonds, and 
cash from the safe and display cases and put them in the bag (T. 
84, 89-93, 121, 125-129, 150). Before leaving the jewelry store, 
the robber commented that they should not try to follow him 
because an accomplice was waiting outside with a gun (T. 103). 
Although Mr. Karmelian and Mr. Church gave varying 
descriptions of the robber, both positively identified defendant, 
John E. Humphrey, as the armed robber (T. 85, 132-33, 136-37, 
142, 187-188, 190, 211-12, 214). Both witnesses also identified 
Exhibit #1, the shotgun subsequently seized from Charles Webb's 
home, as similar to the one used in the robbery (T. 155, 189). 
Britt Martindale testified that at approximately 4:00 
p.m. on the same day, Webb and his girlfriend, Renee Gregersen, 
backed into her driveway (T. 225-226). Webb went into the 
Martindale home, took a blanket off of Britt's waterbed, and 
asked Britt to come outside with him and hold up one side of the 
blanket behind the trunk of the car (T. 227-228, 273, 278). Webb 
then told Gregersen to hit the trunk and when the trunk opened, 
Britt saw defendant in the trunk (T. 228, 278, 279). Defendant, 
who was living at the Martindale home at the time, went straight 
into the bathroom and shaved off his beard (T. 229, 280). 
Meanwhile, Webb retrieved from the car a canvas bag and a 12-
gauge sawed-off shotgun with black tape around the handle (T. 
230-31). Britt later identified Exhibit #1 as the shotgun Webb 
carried into her house (T. 284). 
Webb and Gregersen sorted through the jewelry taken 
from the bag (T. 232). Defendant walked back and forth between 
the bathroom and the kitchen while shaving and explaining "how he 
put the shotgun in some guy's face" and handcuffed a guard who 
arrived during the robbery (T. 237). Webb exclaimed that 
"everything went great," that "the cops didn't show up" for a 
while, and that he knew everything was okay when "all he saw was 
an old man coming over a fence." (T. 237.) Later that day, 
defendant, Webb, and Britt's husband, Russell Martindale, left 
for Las Vegas (T. 241). 
Britt testified she knew Russell had stolen a car, but 
denied knowing it was to be used to facilitate the robbery (T. 
252). Russell was granted immunity for stealing the car in 
return for his testimony (T. 402-3). He testified that Webb told 
him he would pay the rent on Russell's house if he would steal a 
car for him (T. 408). Webb also told Russell that he knew 
someone in Las Vegas that could get rid of the items that he and 
defendant had stolen (T. 405). 
On November 2, 1987, the police received a tip that 
Britt Martindale had information concerning the King's robbery 
(T. 295-96, 330). Based on a statement Britt gave to Detective 
Harvey Jackson of the Salt Lake City Police Department on 
November 3, 1987, the police obtained an arrest warrant for 
defendant, Webb, and Gregersen (T. 330, 334-6, 650). 
When the police entered the Webb/Greggersen home, 
defendant was arrested in one of the bedrooms and Webb was 
arrested in another bedroom with a sawed-off shotgun under the 
bed (R. 669, 675). Gregersen's purse was searched for weapons 
incident to her arrest and a diamond watch was found which she 
later told police came from the King's robbery (T. 671). 
Gregersen consented to a search of her property for weapons and 
jewelry (T. 653, 669-70, 674). Among other items, the police 
took into evidence a diamond and sapphire ring (T. 655). Mr. 
Karmillian testified that both the diamond watch and the diamond 
and sapphire ring were among those items stolen from his store 
(T. 111). Britt testified that the seized watch was the same 
watch Webb gave Gregerson at her house following the robbery (T. 
232). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was not denied effective assistance of 
counsel due to a conflict of interest. Defendant has not 
established that an actual conflict of interest existed between 
defendant's counsel and co-defendant's counsel, both of whom were 
members of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. Where no 
actual conflict is shown, no prejudicial error can be presumed. 
The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction for Aggravated Robbery. Defendant was identified by 
two eyewitnesses as the robber. 
Because no substantial prosecutorial misconduct 
occurred, defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the theory 
of cumulative error. 
Defendant's motion for recusal was unsupported by any 
evidence of bias and therefore its dismissal was not prejudicial 
error. 
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Defendant's due process rights were not violated when a 
photo array shown to a witness was not preserved for trial. The 
photo array was not preserved because the witness could not 
positively identify defendant's photo. However, the witness 
positively identified defendant at trial. In light of the 
positive identification at trial, it was not prejudicial error to 
fail to preserve an inconclusive photo array. 
The claims raised in defendant's pro se supplemental 
brief should be rejected. The many issues raised are unpreserved 




DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE THE CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST ISSUE, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT AN ACTUAL 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTED AND THAT 
PREJUDICE OCCURRED. 
A. Defendant Failed To Raise The Conflict of 
Interest Issue In The Trial Court Below. 
Defendant infers in his brief that he has preserved for 
review the conflict of interest issue arising between his 
attorney and co-defendant Webb's attorney, both appointed from 
the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. (Brief of App. at 13*) 
However, a review of the record reveals that defendant failed to 
raise the issue in the trial court below. 
It is well-established that this Court will not 
consider an issue on appeal which was not raised in the trial 
court and preserved for appeal. Floyd v. Western Surgical 
Associates, Inc., 773 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1989); State v. 
Steqqellf 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983). A defendant must afford the 
trial court an opportunity to correct any error at the trial 
level- See State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 599 (Utah 1988). 
On appeal, defendant cites to three points in the 
record in support of his claim: (1) Webb's Motion to Sever his 
trial from defendant's; (2) defendant's pro se Motion for 
Conflict of Interest and Trial Separation; and, (3) Webb's Motion 
for a New Trial (R. 81, 98, 287-88). However, a review of these 
record citations reveals that no conflict of interest issue 
between attorneys from the Legal Defender Office was timely 
raised by defendant. 
Defendant's pro se Motion for Conflict of Interest 
states that a conflict existed because Webb would be deprived of 
a fair trial where more evidence would be introduced against 
defendant than Webb (R. 98). Prior to trial, Judge Sawaya heard 
defendant and Webb's motions to sever co-defendant Gregersen due 
to her incriminating statements to the police (T. 640-45). At 
this time, defendant's counsel specifically stated that she had 
no objection to defendant and Webb being tried together (T. 644). 
Although defendant filed several pro se motions in the trial 
court alleging a conflict of interest, they address only 
defendant's conflict of interest with his attorney, or the trial 
judge, and do not raise a conflict of interest between the 
attorneys from the Legal Defender Office (R. 109-15, 123, 271). 
Defendant further claims he made repeated requests for 
severance from Webb and cites the record where he claims he 
raised the conflict of interest issue between the Legal Defender 
Attorneys. (Brief of App. at 14). Contrary to defendant's 
claim, the record cite does not refer to defendant raising the 
conflict issue, but to Webb's post-trial letter to his own 
counsel raising the issue (R. 287-88). Defendant fails to cite 
to the record where his claimed repeated requests for severance 
can be found or where he, not Webb, raised the issue of a 
conflict of interest between the legal defenders. 
Additionally, at defendant's hearing on his Motion for 
New Trial, defendant's counsel referred to a pro se motion by 
defendant which raised several issues (T. 745). However, this 
pro se motion cannot be found in the record. Defendant's counsel 
summarized defendant's allegations in the motion which included a 
conflict of interest with his attorney who he believed as Min 
collusion with the [prosecution] in altering the police reports 
and tapes of the preliminary hearing and . . . only pointed out 
some of the inconsistencies in the Martindale testimony rather 
than all of them" (T. 747). Defendant did not claim a conflict 
of interest issue between the Legal Defender attorneys. Because 
defendant failed to raise the conflict issue at any time below, 
he cannot now claim error for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). 
B. Defendant Was Not Denied Effective 
Assistance Of Counsel Due To An 
Alleged Conflict Of Interest. 
1. Federal Constitutional Analysis. 
Defendant argues that he was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel under the Utah and federal constitutions 
due to a conflict of interest affecting his trial attorney's 
performance. He claims that an inherent conflict existed because 
his counsel and co-defendant's counsel were both from the Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association. 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
adherence to the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance 
of counsel. State v. Carterf 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 15 (S. Ct. 
5/12/89); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In 
order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant "must 
show, first, that his or her counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, 
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the 
defendant." Carter, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15, citing, 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 
The Strickland court held that the appropriate test for 
prejudice is that M[t]he defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 446 U.S. at 695. See 
also, State v. Carter, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 15 (S. Ct. 
5/12/89). Failure to show either deficient performance or 
resulting prejudice will defeat a claim of ineffective counsel. 
State v, Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). 
Applying the ineffective assistance of counsel test to 
a claim of conflict of interest, the United States Supreme Court 
uses two different approaches depending on the procedural 
setting. The first is used when a potential conflict is brought 
to the attention of the court before trial. Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). Once notified, the court must 
take adequate steps to remedy the problem so that the defendant 
is not deprived of effective assistance of counsel. People v. 
Jones, 121 111.2d 21, 111 111.Dec. 164, 520 N.E.2d 325, 329 
(1988), citing, Holloway, 435 U.S. 475. 
The second approach is employed when a conflict is not 
alleged until after trial and requires the defendant to show that 
an actual conflict of interest existed at trial that adversely 
affected his counsel's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335, 349 (1980). A defendant "bears the burden of establishing 
the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of counsel, and proof of such 
must be a demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter." 
State v. McNicholf 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976). 
In the present case, defendant did not raise a conflict 
of interest claim between his counsel and co-defendant's counsel 
at any time. Defendant improperly infers in his brief that 
Webb's pre-trial Motion to Sever, which was made by Webb's 
privately retained counsel, should have alerted the court to an 
inherent conflict of interest (R. 82). (Br. of App. at 13-14.) 
However, the motion merely states that Webb believed that 
substantially more evidence would be introduced against defendant 
than himself and that he would be prejudiced in the eyes of the 
jury due to guilt by association (R. 82). 
Likewise, defendant Humphrey's pro se Motion for 
Conflict of Interest and Trial Separation argues that Webb will 
be deprived of a fair trial because more evidence would be 
introduced against defendant than Webb (R. 98). It further 
appears that the alleged conflict of interest claim raised in the 
Motion between defendant and his attorney, not between the 
attorneys from the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (R. 109-
15, 123, 271; T. 12). 
In his brief, defendant concedes that he was not 
entitled to a severance as a matter of right and does not raise 
the issue on appeal. (Br. of App. at 14). In fact, defendant 
specifically waived an opportunity to pursue a severance of 
defendant and Webb (T. 644). Rather, defendant claims that 
because of the joint representation by Legal Defenders, he was 
precluded from pursuing a defense on the theory that Webb was the 
guilty party and that he was simply being drawn into the crime 
through suggestive photo displays. (Br. of App. at 14). 
Defendant speculates that had his attorney pursued an 
antagonistic defense rather than a defense based on mutually 
corroborating claims of innocence, the result would likely have 
been different. (Br. of App. at 19.) 
The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the issue of whether a 
legal defender association may represent co-defendants with an 
alleged conflict of interest in State v. Heaps, slip op. No. 
16264 (S. Ct. filed October 31, 1979) (unpublished). (See 
Addendum "A"; Opinion.). Heaps rejected the defendant's claim 
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to his co-
defendant being represented by the same legal defender 
association. The Court ruled: 
Significantly, the defendant never asked 
for different counsel at any time during the 
pre-trial proceedings and he never registered 
any dissatisfaction with the performance of 
his counsel until after he was convicted and 
sentenced. Although the defendant claims 
there was conflict of interest, he does not 
specify what it was, other than the fact that 
he was "represented in pre-trial proceedings 
by the Legal Defender's Association, who also 
represented the untried co-defendant" and 
that this Mmay require" reversal of his 
conviction and a new trial. 
To prevail on his claim, it would be 
necessary for it to appear that there was a 
conflict of interest which in some manner may 
have reacted to the defendant's detriment. 
Nothing of that character appears in this 
case and none can be presumed merely because 
different attorneys from the Legal Defender's 
Office had represented defendant. 
Slip op. at page 2. Thus, the court held that a legal defender 
association is not per se prohibited from representing co-
defendants whose interests may be in conflict and an appellant 
must show an actual detrimental conflict existed in the record. 
Id. Accord State v. Jelks# 105 Ariz. 175, 461 P.2d 473 (1969); 
State v. Gutierrez, 116 Ariz. 207, 568 P.2d 1105 (Ariz. App. 
1977); and State v. Gross, 221 Kan. 98, 558 P.2d 665 (1976). 
In State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986) the Utah 
Supreme Court again addressed the issue of whether a conflict 
existed where the Legal Defender's Office represented co-
defendants. The court held that the defendant was not denied 
effective assistance of counsel where the claim of conflict was 
merely speculative. Barella, 714 P.2d at 288-89, citing State v. 
Jelks, 105 Ariz. 175, 461 P.2d 473 (1969); and United States v. 
Lugo, 350 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1965). 
Similarly, in Batchelor v. Smith, 555 P.2d 871 (Utah 
1976), the Utah Supreme Court held that there "is no just reason 
to accuse an attorney of incompetence simply because she may be 
the spouse of another attorney who is in the case; and this is 
especially true where both attorneys are striving to thwart the 
efforts of the prosecuting attorney." Batchelor, 555 P.2d at 
872. The court opined that the seeds of ineffectiveness of 
counsel claims "have often fallen in fertile judicial soil. It 
seems to be the last refuge of those who make no claim of 
innocence but have a burning yen to escape from the penalties 
provided by law for their criminal conduct." Batchelor, 555 P.2d 
at 871-72. 
Defendant relies on several authorities holding that an 
actual conflict of interest exists when co-defendants are jointly 
represented. However, many of these cases are factually 
distinguishable in that a single attorney represented more than 
2 
one defendant with conflicting interests. In contrast to 
defendant's claim, a number of courts have held that two 
attorneys appointed from a Legal Defender's Association may 
individually represent co-defendants in the same trial where no 
3 
conflict of interest is shown. 
2 
Defendant cites the following: Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 
475 (1978); State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697 (Utah 1980); State v. 
Robinson, 662 P.2d 1341 (N.Mex. 1983); United States v . 
Martinez, 630 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1980); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335 (5th Cir. 1980); State v. Thompson, 108 Ariz. 500, 502 
P.2d 1319 (1972). 
3
 See State v. Rogers, 177 N.J.Super. 365, 426 A.2d 1035 (1981); 
Hernandez v. Mondragon, 824 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1987); Richardson 
v. State, 439 N.E.2d 610 (Ind. 1982); Averhart v. State, 470 
N.E.2d 666 (Ind. 1984); People v. Dallas, 40 111. Dec. 110, 85 
Here, while both defense counsel were associated with 
the same Legal Defender Office, both defendant and Webb were 
represented by separate, competent, conflict-free counsel. As 
defendant notes in his brief, "what was presented to the jury was 
a united front where both defendants would succeed or fail 
together." (Br. of App. at 20.) This defense approach was 
simply a matter of trial strategy and was not objected to by 
defendant until after the jury's verdict of guilty. The record 
clearly shows that defendant's counsel enthusiastically advocated 
4 
his cause in making numerous objections and motions. It cannot 
be said that a "diminution in the zeal of representation" of 
defendant occurred from the joint representation of co-defendants 
by the same law association. (Br. of App. at 20.) 
Both attorneys gave individual opening and closing 
arguments for their respective defendants (T. 71-82, 585-612). 
Cont. App.3d 153, 405 N.E.2d 1202 (111. App. Ct. 1980); State 
v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 447 A.2d 525 (1982); State v. Robinson, 99 
N.M. 674, 662 P.2d 1341 (1983); Osborn v. Schillinger, 639 F.Supp 
610 (D. Wyo. 1986), order affirmed by 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 
1988); Davis v. Franzen, 671 F.2d 1056 (7th Cir. 1982). But see 
Rodriguez v. State, 129 Ariz. 67, 628 P.2d 950 (1981). 
4 
Defendant's appointed counsel from the Legal Defender's Office 
made the following motions to the court; Motion for Discovery 
(R. 31, 41, T. 632); Motion to Sever from Gregersen (R. 55, T. 
640-47); Motion in Limine to Suppress Defendant's Prior 
Convictions (R. 72); Motion to Suppress Identification (R. 74); 
Motion for New Trial (R. 289, T. 745-8); Motion to Dismiss (T. 
425 and T. 323); Motion for Mistrial (T. 426, 540 and 623); 
Defense Counsel also joined in the Motion to Dismiss made at 
trial by co-defendnt's counsel (T. 323). Counsel also made 
rigorous objections at trial on behalf of defendant (T. 186, 380, 
426, 453, 478, 500, 557, 564, 623, 625) and gave vigorous cross-
examination to the State's witnesses (T. 117, 175, 193, 219, 275, 
307, 328, 332, 351). Counsel also called several defense 
witnesses (T. 353, 366, 369, 432). 
_n A _ 
Webb's counsel stated clearly in opening argument that she was 
independant of defendant's counsel in her representation of Webb 
and stressed that the jury must view them individually (T. 77-
78). In closing argument, Webb's counsel again reiterated to 
the jury that although there is some "overlap in certain 
instances in terms of defending our respective defendants, the 
cases against them are separate and they must be looked at by you 
in that same type of fashion.H (T. 603). 
An examination of the instant record reveals that no 
conflict of interest existed between the defendant and co-
defendant. Defendant was positively identified by two persons at 
King's Custom Jewelers as the person who held up the jewelry 
store (T. 85, 142, 287-88); two other witnesses testified that 
both defendant and Webb were responsible for the aggravated 
robbery (T. 85, 142, 187-88); both defendant and Webb were 
arrested together and charged with the crime (T. 665-66); some of 
the stolen articles were found in their possession as well as a 
gun identified by witnesses as similar to that used in the 
robbery (T. Ill, 155, 189, 669, 671); and both defendants took 
the stand and corroborated the other's testimony that they had 
been set up (T. 432-492, 503-538). 
Defense counsel's trial strategy cannot be used to 
determine whether she was effective or whether the alleged 
conflict between defendant and co-defendant was prejudicial. In 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 
988 (1981) the Utah Supreme Court held the "[t]rial tactics lie 
within the prerogative of counsel and may not be dictated by his 
client. Decisions as to what witnesses to call, what objections 
to make, and, by and large, what defenses to interpose are 
generally left to the professional judgment of counsel." Wood, 
648 P.2d at 91. As Justice Frankfurter noted in Glasser# 
"'[jjoint representation is a means of insuring against 
reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives strength 
against a common attack.'" Halloway v. Arkansasf 435 U.S. 475, 
482-83 (1978)), quoting, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 
92 (1942). It is generally accepted that "[sjtrategic decisions 
are not the kind which the courts permit convicted felons to 
indulge in second guessing." State v. Huizar, 112 Ariz. 489, 543 
P.2d 1118, 1120 (1975). Here, defendant has failed to show "how 
counsel's decisions were not merely tactical choices or how [her] 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
judgment." State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1989). In 
State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme 
court cited with approval the language in United States v. Lugo, 
350 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1965) where the court stated: 
[W]hile we cannot indulge in nice 
calculations about the amount of prejudice 
which results from a conflict of interest . . . 
neither can we create a conflict of interest out 
of mere conjecture as to what might have been 
shown." 
Barella, 714 P.2d at 289, quoting, Lugo, 350 F.2d at 859. 
Defendant has also failed to show how a conflict, if it 
existed, operated to his detriment at trial other than to 
speculate how independent counsel would have conducted his 
defense. (See Br. of App. at 19-20.) In the absence of a 
showing of prejudice, an ineffective assistance claim must fail. 
Geary, 707 P.2d at 646. 
2. State Constitutional Analysis 
Defendant argues that an accused should be granted more 
rights under the Utah Constitution than the federal constitution. 
He urges this Court to adopt a rule that an inquiry be mandated 
at the trial level in all cases of multiple representation by the 
same law association, and that remedial measures such as 
severance/ appointment of independent counsel, or waiver be 
required if a potential conflict appears. (Br. of App. at 21.) 
As recognized by defendant, Utah has adopted the 
universally accepted federal Strickland standard in reviewing 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Archuleta, 
747 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1987). Further, defendant concedes 
that the Utah and federal provisions are textually identical and 
that the Utah Supreme Court has expressly rejected any 
modification of the federal Strickland standard. State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 118-19 n.2 (Utah 1989). (Br. of App. at 8-9). 
Defendant merely complains that the failure of the Utah courts to 
consider the parameters of the state guarantee "has created case 
law which simply 'march[es] lock-step with interpretation given 
to . . . the United States Constitution.'" (Br. of App. at 9.) 
(quoting State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 272 (Utah 1986) (Durham, 
J., concurring)). 
The State concedes that this Court may continue to 
follow the federal minimum guarantees or may extend further state 
protections. See State v. Earl# 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985). However, 
because defendant failed to raise the conflict of interest issue 
in the trial court below, much less articulate state 
constitutional grounds as a basis for his claim, this Court 
should not consider defendant's state constitutional claim on 
appeal. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
In any event, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that 
their reasoning in evaluating ineffective assistance claims is 
consistent with Strickland. State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
1984). Further, the Utah Supreme Court has refused to modify the 
Strickland test. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 118-19 n.2. 
Accordingly, if this Court is inclined to specify separate state 
constitutional standards in evaluating effective assistance of 
counsel, respondent submits that the Strickland test has been 
adopted by the Utah courts as a workable standard. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION. 
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence 
presented at trial to support his conviction. A review of the 
evidence, however, reveals that defendant's claim is without 
merit. 
The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in State v. Booker, 
709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that where a defendant claims the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the standard 
of review is narrow. 
[W]e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict of the jury. We reverse a 
jury conviction for insufficient 
-18-
evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant commited the 
crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Petree, Utah, 659, P.2d 443, 444 
(1983); accord State v. McCardell, Utah, 652 
P.2d 942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the 
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. "It is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence 
and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses. . . H State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 
P.2d 229, 231 (1980); accord State v. Linden, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. . . . 
Id. at 345. 
Defendant was convicted of the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery which provides as follows: 
Aggravated robbery. — 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery 
if in the course of committing robbery he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife 
or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the 
first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be deemed to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, 
or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission of a robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978). Thus, the elements of 
Aggravated Robbery applicable to this case are that the 
prosecution establish that defendant: (1) used a firearm or a 
facsimile of a firearm, (2) in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of a robbery. 
4 ft 
A review of the evidence offered at trial establishes 
each and every element of the offense. The record shows that on 
October 21, 1987 an armed man held the owner of King's Custom 
Jewelers, Karekine Karmelian, and Trolley Square security guard, 
Stephen Church, at gunpoint as he robbed the store of jewelry, 
diamonds, and cash, valued at $40,000 to $42,000 (T. 83-84, 89-
90, 102, 174). During the robbery, the man pulled a sawed-off 
shotgun from a cloth bag and directed Mr. Karmelian to empty the 
jewelry, diamonds, and cash from the safe and display cases and 
put them in the bag (T. 84, 89-93, 121, 125-129, 150). The 
robber also directed the security guard to handcuff himself to 
Mr. Karmilian and give the robber the handcuff key (T. 131-32, 
184-85, 187, 199, 202). Before leaving the jewelry store, the 
robber commented that they should not try to follow him because 
an accomplice was waiting outside with a gun (T. 103). 
Although Mr. Karmelian and Mr. Church gave varying 
descriptions of the robber, both positively identified defendant, 
John E. Humphrey, as the armed robber (T. 85, 132-33, 136-37, 
142, 187-188, 190, 211-12, 214). Both witnesses also identified 
Exhibit #1, the shotgun subsequently seized from Charles Webb's 
home, as similar to the one used in the robbery (T. 155, 189). 
Russell Martindale testified that Webb promised to pay 
his rent if Russell would steal a car for him (T. 408). After 
making arrangements with Russell regarding how to steal the car 
and where to take it, defendant drove Russell to a car lot to 
steal the car (T. 408-10). Using the pretense of taking the car 
for a test drive, Russell took the car to a McDonald's parking 
lot and gave the keys to Webb (T. 409-10). The stolen car was 
used in the robbery the next day and was found by police three 
weeks later abandoned in a parking lot (T. 334, 347, 381, 393). 
A hat and coat found inside the car matched the description of 
the clothing worn by the robber (T. 344-45, 376-77). 
Britt Martindale testified that Webb and Renee 
Gregersen arrived at her house about a half an hour after the 
robbery and backed Webb's Cadillac into her driveway (T. 225-26). 
Webb took a blanket off of Britt's waterbed and instructed her to 
follow him outside and hold up one end of the blanket behind the 
trunk of the car (T. 227-28, 273, 278). When Gregersen opened 
the trunk, Britt saw defendant in the trunk (T. 228, 278-79). 
Defendant, who was living with the Martindale'8 at the time, 
climbed out of the trunk and went immediately into the bathroom 
to shave off his beard (T. 229, 279-80, 435, 443-44). Webb 
carried a canvas bag and a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun into the 
Martindale home (T. 230-31). Britt identified Exhibit #1 as the 
shotgun Webb took into her house (T. 284). 
Britt watched Webb and Gregersen sort through the 
jewelry taken from the bag (T. 232, 236). She observed a diamond 
watch, diamonds folded up in paper, colored stones, U.S. coins, 
currency, and Canadian money (T. 232-34). Britt also noticed a 
Trolley Square insignia on the inside of some of the boxes (T. 
272-274). Webb asked defendant if Gregersen could keep the 
diamond watch, to which defendant agreed (T. 233). Webb 
commented that everything had gone well and that the police did 
not show up for a while (T. 237). Defendant walked back and 
forth between the bathroom and the kitchen while shaving and 
explaining "how he put the shotgun in some guy's faceH and 
handcuffed a guard who arrived during the robbery (T. 237, 414-
15). 
When Russell Martindale arrived, Webb, Gregersen, and a 
clean shaven defendant left with the money, jewelry, and stones 
in a small brown paper bag (T. 236, 239, 264, 400). Webb told 
Britt not to "mess" with the bag used in the robbery until he 
came back to get it (T. 239). Webb returned a couple hours later 
and said he was going to put the bag in the river (T. 240). 
Defendant and Webb returned around 11$30 p.m., picked up Russell 
and the shotgun, and left for Las Vegas (T. 241, 405). Webb said 
he knew someone in Las Vegas who would be able to get rid of the 
items he and defendant had stolen (T. 405). 
After arriving in Las Vegas, Webb admittedly pawned 
some diamonds (T. 386, 526, 534). At one pawn shop, Webb took a 
ring to the window and asked Russell for his driver's license (T. 
387). At trial, Russell admitted signing the pawn slip but 
testified he did not know what he was signing at the time (T. 
387). Russell also testified that defendant and Webb left him 
alone several times for hours (T. 405). Russell travelled with 
defendant and Webb approximately 3-4 days until they parted 
company in Portland (T. 411). 
Based upon information from Britt Martindale, the 
police obtained arrest warrants for the defendant, Webb, and 
Gregersen (T. 334-36, 650). When the police went to the 
Webb/Gregersen home to make the arrests, defendant was found in 
one of the bedrooms and Webb was found in another bedroom with a 
sawed-off shotgun under the bed (T. 669, 675). Gregersen's purse 
was searched for weapons incident to her arrest and a diamond 
watch was found in her purse which she later told police came 
from the King's robbery (T. 671). Gregersen consented to a 
search of her property for weapons and jewelry (T. 653, 669-70, 
674). Among other items, the police took into evidence a diamond 
and sapphire ring (T. 655). Mr. Karmillian testified that both 
the diamond watch and the diamond and sapphire ring were among 
those items stolen from his store (T. 111). Britt Martindale 
also testified that Webb gave Gregerson the watch following the 
robbery (T. 232). 
Based upon the evidence, a jury could have reasonably 
concluded that defendant used a sawed-off shotgun in committing a 
robbery at King's Custom Jewelers. The evidence was more than 
sufficient to establish the requisite elements of the offense. 
Defendant appears to further argue that the evidence 
was insufficient because some evidence, if believed, tends to 
show that defendant did not commit the offense. In making his 
argument, defendant ignores the fundamental principle that a 
jury's belief or disbelief of a defendant'6 theory of a crime is 
a matter within the jury's exclusive prerogative to weigh the 
credibility of the witness' testimony. State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 
229 (Utah 1980); Efco Distributing, Inc., v. Perrinf 17 Utah 2d 
375, 412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966). The basic function of the jury is 
to weigh the conflicting evidence and draw conclusions therefrom. 
State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986). Despite testimony to 
the contrary, the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that defendant committed the offenses of which he was 
convicted. State v. Petreef 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). 
POINT III 
NO CUMULATIVE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
OCCURRED WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of alleged 
improper prosecutorial remarks warrants a new trial. Defendant's 
claim is frivolous. 
It is well-established that a defendant must show some 
degree of demonstrable prejudice in order to successfully argue 
error based on prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988), On Reconsideration, 109 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 21 (5/30/89). The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part 
test for determining whether a prosecutor's remark warrants 
reversal; "(1) did the remarks call to the attention of the 
jurors matters which they could not propely consider in 
determining their verdict, and (2) were the jurors under the 
circumstances of the particular case probably influenced by those 
remarks." State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d 185, 187 (Utah 1986). Under 
Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures, H[a]ny error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." This Court 
should not reverse a conviction unless the error "is something 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a 
different result." State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 
1985), quoting State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1980). 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that 
"'[c]ounsel for both sides have considerable latitude in their 
[closing] arguments to the jury; they have a right to discuss 
fully from their stand points the evidence and the inferences and 
deductions arising therefrom.'" State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d at 
1255, quoting State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 
426 (1973). Any improper comment may be effectively cured by the 
trial court's admonishment to the jury to disregard the improper 
statement. See State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987). Additionally, a 
curative jury instruction is generally sufficient to obviate any 
harm from an improper comment by the prosecutor. State v. Hales# 
652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1982); State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 
(Utah 1983). 
The concept of H'[cjumulative error refers to a number 
of errors which prejudice [a] defendant's rights to a fair 
trial."1 Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1988) (quoting 
State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987); State v. Rammel, 721 
P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986)). Where no substantial errors were 
committed, the concept of cumulative error does not apply. Bundy 
v. DeLand, 763 P.2d at 806; State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 38 
(Utah 1989). 
Additionally, an appellant must indicate from the 
record that he made a proper objection below. State v. Barella, 
714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986). Failure to refer to pages in the 
record to support points on appeal will normally require the 
Court to assume regularity in the proceedings and correctness of 
the judgment appealed from. State v. 01mos# 712 P.2d 27 (Utah 
1986). 
Defendant alleges several instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct, yet fails to cite to his objections in the record. 
(Br. of App. at 27.) Defendant failed to object to the 
prosecutor's reference in closing argument to a police stop of 
defendant and Webb in the State of Oregon (T. 617). Defendant 
also failed to join in Webb's objections to the cross-examination 
of defendant regarding the police stop (T. 488-90). He failed to 
object to the prosecutor allegedly eliciting tesitmony that Webb 
used an alias (T. 327). Because defendant failed to object 
below, this Court should find that he has not preserved these 
issues for appeal. Olmos, 712 P.2d at 287. 
Turning to the defendant's allegations of misconduct to 
which he did object, it is clear that no substantial error 
occurred. Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly 
elicited testimony that connected defendant and Webb to other 
crimes. He points to the prosecutor's direct examination of 
Detective Lomax which occurred as follows: 
Q: You made marks on the one figure that's 
labeled "bed". That's where you say you 
found the shotgun? 
A: Partially protruding. 
Q: And the other mark appears on the item 
that is labeled— 
A: Dresser. As I Recall, it was in a 
jewelry case there. 
Q: Okay, thank you. You may return to your 
seat. Did you receive any instructions 
about what you were looking for with 
regards to the jewlery box? 
A: Well, obviously, we were looking for the 
shotgun. I received a phone call from 
Detective Dalling indicating that there 
were a couple of rings in the jewelry box 
that he had been told by Reneee that were 
given to her by either Webb or Humphrey. 
MS. WELLS: Objection. 
MR. COPE: Not offered to prove the matter 
asserted, merely to show why he 
was looking in the jewelry box. 
THE COURT: In any event, I think it is 
prejudicial and should be 
stricken. I will admonish the 
jury to discard that answer. 
(T. 304-05; Webb's objection T. 305, 323-24; joined by defendant 
T. 324). While Webb's counsel did not state a specific ground 
for her objection, it appears that she was complaining of the 
hearsay statements of Renee Gregersen to the police that jewelry 
could be found in her jewelry box. Id. Webb's objection was 
sustained and the jury admonished to disregard the response. Id. 
Judge Sawaya later denied Webb's Motion for New Trial finding 
that the comment was "not that prejudicial" and that it did not 
warrant a curative instruction. In view of the minimal prejudice 
that could be inferred from the comment and the judge's quick 
response in admonishing the jury to disregard the comment, no 
substantial error occurred. 
Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor 
inappropriately inferred in closing argument that defendant 
refused to be in a line-up. In response to defendant's counsel's 
comment in closing argument that no line-up was conducted, the 
prosecutor commented as follows: 
Have a good look at that composite sketch 
that was introduced by the defense and 
compare it with the 1986 photograph 
authenticated by Mr. Humphrey himself about 
what he looked like with a beard on, an 
incredibly good likeness, I would say. No 
line-up. There was no line-up. Oh, my 
goodness, we can't have a line-up if the 
defendant doesn't want to participate in one. 
And if we have one or if we showed some 
pictures, then the defense is going to say we 
suggested to these people what they were 
supposed to say, so we are in no position— 
Yes# there was no line-up, but why do we need 
a line-up when you have the people, when you 
have the eyewitnesses saying yes, that's who 
it was, when you have a third party saying 
these people participated in a robbery that 
my husband helped to stage. 
(T. 615.) Later, defendant's counsel, joined by Webb's counsel, 
moved for a mistrial arguing that the prosecutor's comment 
implied that defendant refused to participate in a line-up and 
thus violated defendant's right to remain silent (T. 623). The 
prosecutor responded that the issue was fairly raised in 
defendant's closing argument where he complained that no line-up 
was conducted. JId. He explained that he was merely pointing out 
that the State would be criticized if it conducted a line-up and 
criticized if it did not. Jd. Judge Sawaya denied the motion. 
Defendant's claim should be rejected where the comment was fairly 
in response to defendant's closing arument, was a fair comment on 
the evidence, and caused no perceivable prejudice to defendant. 
It must be noted that the trial judge submitted several 
instructions to the jury which would have a curative effect on 
the claimed errors of defendant. The trial court instructed the 
jury not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, evidence 
stricken by the court, or any question to which an objection wai 
sustained (T. 233; Jury Instruction No. 6). The jury was also 
instructed to not conjecture as to what an answer might have been 
or the reason for an objection. Ijd. The jury was told to "not 
consider as evidence any statment of counsel made during trial, 
unless such statement was made as an admission or stipulation 
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conceding the existence of a fact or facts" (R. 235; Jury 
Instruction No. 8). (See also Jury Instruction No. 12; R. 239.) 
As noted earlier# a curative jury instruction is 
generally sufficient to obviate any harm from an improper comment 
by a witness or counsel. State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 
(Utah 1982). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this 
Court "must assume that the jurors were conscientious in 
performing to their duty, and that they followed the instructions 
of the court." State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322, 
1324 (1974); State v. White, 577 P.2d 552, 555 (Utah 1978). 
In sum, defendant claims that he is entitled to a new 
trial on the basis of cumulative error arising from independent 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Based on the foregoing 
discussion of defendant's allegations of error, a new trial is 
not warranted on the basis of any individual error or on a theory 
of cumulative error. Contrary to defendant's claim, the evidence 
of defendant's guilt was strong and was based on evidence of his 
direct involvement in the planning, execution, and flight from 
the robbery. Because no substantial errors occurred, the concept 
of cumulative error is inapplicable. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 38 (Utah 1989). 
POINT IV 
JUDGE WILKINSON PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE SAWAYA. 
Defendant claims that his pro se affidavit to recuse 
the Judge Sawaya was sufficient to raise "at least [the] 
appearance of bias" and that the trial judge's refusal to recuse 
himself resulted in actual prejudice to defendant. (Br. of App. 
at 29.) In support of his argument, defendant cites the 
allegations made in his affidavit but fails to support them with 
record evidence. (Br. of App. at 29.) Because defendant fails 
to refer to pages in the record to support points on appeal, this 
Court should assume regularity in the proceedings below. State 
v. 01mos# 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986). 
In any event, Judge Wilkinson properly denied 
defendant's motion to recuse Judge Sawaya. Utah Code Ann. §77-
35-29(c) and (d) (Supp. 1989) sets forth the procedure to be 
followed when an affidavit has been filed to disqualify a judge: 
(c) If the prosecution or a defendant in 
any criminal action or proceeding files an 
affidavit that the judge before whom the 
action or proceeding is to be tried or heard 
has a bias or prejudice, either against the 
party or his attorney or in favor of any 
opposing party to the suit, the judge shall 
proceed no further until the challenge is 
disposed of. Every affidavit shall state the 
facts and the reasons for the belief that the 
bias or prejudice exists and shall be filed 
as soon as practicable after the case has 
been assigned or the bias or prejudice is 
known. No affidavit may be filed unless 
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of 
record that the affidavit and application are 
made in good faith. 
(d) If the challenged judge questions the 
sufficiency of the allegation of disqualifi-
cation, he shall enter an order directing 
that a copy be forthwith certified to another 
named judge of the same court or of a court 
of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then 
pass upon the legal sufficiency of the 
allegations. If the challenged judge does 
not question the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavit, or if the judge to whom the 
affidavit is certified finds that it is 
legally sufficient, another judge shall be 
called to try the case or to conduct the 
proceeding. If the judge to whom the 
affidavit is certified does not find the 
affidavit to be legally sufficient, he shall 
enter a finding to that effect and the 
challenged judge shall proceed with the case 
or proceeding. 
(emphasis added.). Applying the recusal statute, the Utah 
Supreme Court recently held that! 
while, we recommend the practice that a judge 
recuse himself where there is a colorable 
claim of bias or prejudice, absent a showing 
of actual bias or an abuse of discretion, 
failure to do so does not constitute 
reversible error as long as the requirements 
of section 77-35-29 are met. 
State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Utah), cert, denied, 108 
S. Ct. 2876 (1988) (emphasis added). 
In the present case, Judge Sawaya, the trial judge, 
followed the procedure mandated by the statute to determine the 
legal sufficiency of the affidavit. He ordered that a certified 
copy of the affidavit be sent to Judge Wilkinson who, after 
5 
review, found it to be legally insufficient. The statutory 
procedures having been followed, Judge Wilkinson properly denied 
defendant's recusal motion (T. 62). Because defendant has failed 
to show actual bias or an abuse of discretion as required by 
Judge Wilkinson's finding is supported by the record. The 
record shows that contrary to defendant's claim, Judge Sawaya did 
not refuse to answer or acknowledge defendant's pro se motions 
and letters to the court. See defendant's pro se motions and 
letters to the court regarding suppression of identification (R. 
77-80, 93-94, 98-101, 109-14; addressed by Judge Sawaya at T. 3-
11) and disqualification of Judge Sawaya (R. 115; addressed by 
Judge Sawaya at T. 12, 62). Finally, defendant alleges that 
Judge Sawaya refused to allow defendant to assist in his own 
defense. At trial, Judge Sawaya asked defendant if he wanted to 
represent himself (T. 11). Defendant responded that he would 
like to assist in his defense (T. 11). Judge Sawaya then 
explained to defendant that he would have to address the court 
through his attorney (T. 13-14, 16, 721). This directive does 
not amount to a denial of defendant's assistance in his own 
defense. 
Neeley, defendant is therefore not entitled to reversal on a 
theory of judicial bias. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT 
VIOLATED BY THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO 
PRESERVE A PHOTO ARRAY. 
Defendant claims his due process and fair trial rights 
were violated because the police did not preserve a photo array 
shown to the victim. (Br. of App. at 32.) Defendant does not, 
however, claim that the photo array was deliberately destroyed to 
suppress evidence. State v. Stewartf 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975). 
Defendant's claim must be rejected. 
The standard for determining whether a criminal 
conviction should be reversed for destruction of a photo array 
was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Nebeker, 657 
P.2d 1359 (Utah 1983). The court explained that where evidence 
is destroyed/ the materiality required to reverse a conviction is 
more than evidentiary materiality. The Court reasoned as 
follows: 
"Fundamental to either duty [the duty to 
preserve evidence or the duty to disclose it] 
is the prerequisite that the evidence 
destroyed, disposed of, or suppressed by the 
prosecution was material in the 
constitutional sense. The mere possibility 
that an item of undisclosed evidence might 
have helped the defense, or might have 
affected the outcome of the trial, does not 
establish "materiality" in the constitutional 
sense. [Emphasis added.]" 
Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1363. quoting State v. Hudspeth, 22 Wash. 
App. 292, 593 P.2d 548 (1978); accord, United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97 (1976). Later, in State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 
-•*o. 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court clarified the burden to be 
met before a conviction is reversed for destruction of evidence: 
Constitutional materiality requires that 
there be a showing that the suppressed or 
destroyed evidence is vital to the issues of 
whether the defendant is guilty of the charge 
and whether there is a fundamental unfairness 
that requires the Court to set aside the 
defendant's conviction. 
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985); quoting United 
State v. Aqurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976). Applying this 
standard, this Court in State v. Jimenez, 761 P.2d 577, 579 (Utah 
App. 1988), rejected a defendant's claim of reversible error 
where the defendant failed to show that the destroyed evidence 
was anything more than specutively material. 
Analagous to the present case, both the Hudsputh and 
Nebeker courts refused to reverse the defendants' convictions for 
failure to preserve the photo arrays shown to the victims. Both 
courts held that the "defendant was not affirmatively identified 
in the unpreserved array nor did the witnesses fail to identify 
the defendant from an array in which defendant's photograph had 
been specifically placed after the investigation focused on the 
defendant." Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1363 (emphasis added). See 
also, Hudsputh, 593 P.2d at 550. 
In the present case, the victim, Mr. Karmilian, was 
shown two sets of photographs. The first set consisted of 
photographs shown to Mr. Karmilian on the day of the robbery (T. 
140-1, 713, 718). Karmilian could not identify the robber from 
these photographs. Id. Defendant's photograph was not included 
in that array (T. 713, 722). 
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When defendant and Webb were arrested two weeks later, 
Detective Lomax showed Mr. Karmilian another set of photographs 
which included both defendant's and Webb's photographs along with 
five or six other photographs (T. 713, 722). Karmilian selected 
one photograph and said there was a 50/50 chance that the 
identified man was the robber (T. 140-41, 713, 722). At the 
time, Detective Lomax was not sure which photo was defendant and 
which was Webb, nor did he think Mr. Karmilian's 50/50 
identification was significant enough for a positive 
identification (T. 713, 719, 722). As a result, the photos were 
not retained (T. . 719). 
Defendant moved to suppress the identification evidence 
prior to trial. After hearing arguments and testimony, the judge 
denied the motion and ruled that he could not find that the 
identification was tainted or influenced by the photo spread (T. 
725-26). 
Defendant claims that Mr. Karmillian's in-court 
identification of defendant is suspect because the photo arrays 
were not presented and because of the short time Mr. Karmilian 
could have directly observed the robber. (Br. of App. at 31.) 
However, contrary to defendant's assertions, Mr. Karmilian 
testified that he observed defendant as close as three feet and 
at different times during the incident which lasted several 
minutes (T. 85-86, 89-90, 102-06, 120, 125, 131-32, 138, 150-52). 
Although defendant points out discrepancies between Mr. 
Karmilian's description of the robber and defendant's physical 
characteristics, the Utah Supreme Court held in Nebeker thatx 
these are primarily matters of credibility of 
the witness best left to the finders of fact. 
. . . [T]he reliability of [the victim's] 
identification is not necessarily impugned 
because [his] initial description did not 
match the defendant. [His] description of 
the -assailant was generally consistent with 
defendant's appearance, and it was the jury's 
duty to resolve the reliability of the 
testimony." 
Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1362. Officer Frank Hatton-Ward testified 
that nothing in the descriptions given to him by Mr. Xarmilian or 
Mr. Church were grossly different from defendant's physical 
characteristics (T. 363). 
Finally, it is important to note that defendant was 
also positively identified in court by the security guard, Mr. 
Church, who viewed the robber in the store at close range and who 
was not shown any photos of defendant prior to trial (T. 182-90, 
195-97, 202-04, 216). Accordingly, defendant has failed to show 
more than a "mere possibility" that the prosecution's inability 
to present the photo array was material in the constitutional 
sense. 
POINT VI 
THE ISSUES RAISED IN DEFENDANT'S PRO SE 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
On August 4, 1989, defendant filed a pro se 
Supplemental Brief of Appellant. On September 5, 1989, this 
Court granted defendant's Motion for Reconsideration to file the 
supplemental brief. Respondent was given until October 15, 1989 
to file the respondent's brief. 
In response to the supplemental brief, the State must 
candidly admit that it is difficult to follow defendant's pro se 
arguments. In any event, the State will attempt to respond to 
defendant's arguments in the order that they are raised in the 
supplemental brief. 
A. GROUND ONE 
In the section entitled "GROUND ONE," defendant raises 
several issues regarding the testimony of Russell Martindale. He 
claims that: (1) his trial should have been severed from Webb's 
due to Martindale's incriminating testimony; (2) he was deprived 
of discovery of Martindale's testimony; (3) the prosecutor 
perjured himself in closing argument regarding Martindale's 
testimony; (4) he was prejudiced by Webb's requested lesser-
included offense instruction; and (5) he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel. 
In response, the State notes that Russell Martindale 
was called as a defense witness (T. 382). Thus, defendant cannot 
claim prejudice by lack of discovery or failure to sever. 
Neither can defendant succeed on his other claims without 
specifying the claimed error and how he was prejudiced. In that 
the "burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to upset 
the judgment," State v. Jonesf 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982), 
the State should not be put to the task of developing defendant's 
legal arguments just to conclude that they are meritless. 
B. GROUND TWO 
In the section entitled "GROUND TWO," defendant claims 
that inconsistencies existed in the description of the gun and 
the robber. He claims that the inconsistencies constituted the 
knowing use of false testimony. 
~?fi~ 
It is well-established that a conviction obtained by 
the knowing use of perjured testimony will not be upheld if it is 
shown that there is a reasonable likelihood that the perjury 
could have affected the jury's verdict. United States v. Agurs# 
427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 
1984). However, it must be acknowledged that "[e]very lawyer, 
indeed every intelligent layman, recognizes that minor 
discrepancies may occur in statements made by one person at 
different times." State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 227 (Utah 
1980) (emphasis added). As noted in Point V of this brief, minor 
discrepancies regarding the description of an assailant "are 
primarily matters of credibility of the witness best left to the 
finders of fact." State v. Nebeker, 657 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Utah 
1983). 
In the present case, the descriptions of the robber 
were not grossly different than defendant's physical 
characteristics (T. 363). The shotgun was also identified as 
similar to the one used in the robbery (T. 155, 189). In the 
absence of evidence of knowing perjury, this Court should find 
that it was the duty of the jury to resolve the reliability of 
the identification evidence. 
C. GROUND THREE 
In the section entitled "GROUND THREE," defendant 
raises a variety of issues including: (1) a conflict existed 
between defendant and counsel; (2) description information was 
improperly given to the victim; (3) defendant's refusal to 
participate in a lineup; (4) bias on the part of the trial judge; 
(5) denial of a speedy trial; (6) and the trial judge's denial of 
defendant's request for a continuance of trial, appointment of 
new counsel, and self-representation. 
Many of these issues revolve around defendant's 
suspicion that friends of the victim may have conveyed 
description information about defendant to the victim. At trial, 
defendant expressed his dissatisfaction with his counsel's 
efforts to investigate his suspicion (T. 2-14). Counsel reported 
that she had assigned an investigator to the matter and the 
result was a statement by the victim that no one had spoken to 
him regarding defendant's description (T. 5). When Judge Sawaya 
asked defendant if he wanted his attorney dismissed, defendant 
simply responded that he wanted a hearing to further investigate 
any wrongdoing, but that he believed his counsel was a "good 
lawyer" (T. 4). As it became apparent that defendant's motions 
were an attempt to delay the trial, Judge Sawaya denied 
defendant's motions to continue trial (T. 2-14). 
It is abundantly clear from the record that defendant 
was simply attempting to delay trial on any basis (T. 2-14). No 
actual conflict existed between defendant and his counsel. 
Counsel had investigated defendant's suspicions and discovered 
they were unfounded. Thus, no constitutional deficiency in 
counsel occurred by counsel's lack of interest in pursuing a 
frivolous issue. See generally, Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989). 
Regarding defendant's claim surrounding his refusal to 
consent to a lineup, the State cannot decipher the basis of 
defendant's claim or how he was prejudiced. Accordingly, no 
response can be formulated. 
Defendant's claim of judicial bias has been addressed 
in Point IV of this brief and need not be restated. 
Lastly, Judge Sawaya did not abuse his discretion in 
denying defendant's motion for a continuance and appointment of 
stand-by counsel which were made by defendant on the morning of 
the jury trial. Defendant's motions were only made for the 
purpose of delay and were not soundly based. See People v. 
Moore, 47 Cal.3d 63, 252 Cal.Rptr. 494, 762 P.2d 1218, 1224-28 
(S. Ct.), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989) (trial court 
properly denied defendant's motion for substitute counsel, motion 
to act as co-counsel status, and motion to proceed in propria 
persona where defendant's motions were considered on the day of 
trial, where defendant was unable to proceed to trial if motions 
were granted, where defense counsel was ready to proceed, and 
where out-of-state witnesses were present for trial). Thus, no 
reversible error resulted. 
D. GROUND FOUR 
As "GROUND FOUR," defendant claims there are 
inconsistencies between the testimony of Britt Martindale and 
Russell Martindale. Additionally, he claims prosecutorial 
misconduct by the prosecutor's characterizations that no major 
discrepancies existed between Britt and Russell's testimony and 
that defendant pawned stolen jewelry in Las Vegas. 
As discussed above, minor discrepancies in witness 
testimony is a matter of reliability to be decided by the jury. 
Nebeker, 657 P.2d at 1362. Further, a prosecutor is given wide 
discretion in closing argument to discuss the evidence and 
inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State v. Valdez, 30 
Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1973). Applying these legal 
principles, this Court should find that the reliability of the 
Martindales' testimony was properly considered by the jury and 
the prosecutor's inference was fairly based on the evidence. 
E. GROUND FIVE 
Defendant claims as "GROUND FIVE" that he was denied a 
fair trial due to juror bias which was disclosed on voir dire. 
In support of his claim, defendant notes that five (5) jurors 
responded on voir dire that they were acquainted with persons in 
law enforcement. Defendant also cites the United States Supreme 
Court case of Batson v. Kentuckyf 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
Pursuant to Rule 18(e)(14) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, a juror may be removed for cause if the 
challenging party shows the following! 
That a state of mind exists on the part of 
the juror with reference to the case, or to 
either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging. . . . 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14). The selection of a fair and 
Impartial jury falls within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. State v. Lacey# 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah 1983). 
However, it is prejudicial error for the trial court "to compel a 
party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who 
should have been excused for cause.* State v. Hewitty 689 P.2d 
22, 25 (Utah 1984). 
In State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court expressed that only "strong and deep impressions" 
on the part of a prospective juror serve as a basis for 
disqualification for cause. Id. at 1312 (citing State v. Bailey, 
605 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 
(1878)). A juror is considered to have formed strong and deep 
impressions if it is clear that the juror's mind is closed to 
testimony in opposition to those impressions. State v. Hewitt, 
689 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1984). However, "[t]he question of degree 
of partiality (or "impressions") remains largely within the 
discretion of the trial court." Lacey, at 1312 (footnote 
omitted). 
In the instant case, defendant did not challenge for 
cause the jurors he now claims were biased. In the absence of a 
specific and timely challenge for cause, defendant has not 
preserved the issue for appeal. Terry v. Hopt, 3 Utah 396, 4 P. 
250, rev'd on other grounds, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); State v. 
Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983). 
In any event, the jurors responded that they could act 
impartially and would not be influenced in any way by their 
acquaintance with persons in law enforcement (T. 42). In the 
absence of any record evidence of actual bias, defendant's claim 
must be rejected. 
P. GROUND SIX 
Defendant claims as "GROUND SIX" that the "consent to 
search" form was not signed by Renee Gregerson and that the 
police forged her signature on the form. He points to the 
testimony of Linda Knight, a certified graphanalysist, who 
testified at a pretrial suppression hearing that the signature 
was not Ms. Gregerson's (R. 349, pp. 15-35). As legal support, 
defendant cites the fourth amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
Because defendant does not claim that consent was 
involuntarily given, the State will limit its response to the 
issue of whether Ms. Gregerson signed the consent to search form. 
The issue of whether Gregerson signed the consent form was 
essentially a question of fact to be decided by the trial judge 
at the pretrial suppression hearing. This Court will not set 
aside a trial court's finding unless it is clearly erroneous. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). A finding is considered clearly erroneous 
if it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court is convinced, definitely and firmly, that a 
mistake has been made. State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 
(Utah 1988); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987). 
This Court must give due deference to the trial court's 
determinations regarding the credibility of the witnesses and 
conflicting testimony. State v. Kelly, 770 P.2d 98 (Utah 1988); 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1986). 
Reviewing the evidence, the trial court's finding that 
Gregerson signed the consent form is amply supported. The 
testimony established that a permission to search form was filled 
out by the police and presented to Gregerson. (See Addendum "B;" 
Permission to Search Form.) Gregersen signed the form which was 
also witnesses and signed by two police officers. Id. (T. 653, 
670.) At the suppression hearing, Gregersen testified that she 
simply could not remember signing the consent form (T. 697/ 704). 
However, she admitted that the signature on the form looked like 
hers (T. 704). Judge Sawaya found consent and denied defendant's 
motion (R. 68). 
At a re-newed suppression hearing, Gregerson denied 
that the signature on the form was hers (R. 349, 41). Again, she 
simply denied any memory of the form. jld. at 39. Defendant 
offered the testimony of Linda Knight who opined that the 
signature on the consent form was dissimilar to Gregersen's 
signature (R. 349, pp. 14-35). Judge Sawaya again found consent 
and denied defendant's motion (R. 119). 
Under the totality of the record evidence, it cannot be 
said that Judge Sawaya's finding of consent is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. In light of the police officer's 
testimony that Gregerson signed the form and Gregerson's curious 
lack of memory. Judge Sawaya could reasonably believe the police 
officers' testimony and reject Knight's opinion. Accordingly, 
this Court should find that Judge Sawaya did not abuse his 
discretion in finding her consent to be voluntarily given. 
_A?_ 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent requests this 
Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
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1989. 
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